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dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK,
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a motion for rehearing in the above entitled
action reversing the decision of the lower Court in favor of the
defendant and appellant and against plaintiff and respondent and
cross-complainants and respondents.
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DISPOSITION
This Court on December 22, 1976, in a unanimous opinion,
reversed the holding of the District Court and dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THERE WAS A PROPER ACCEPTANCE.
As to the statement in the opinion that there never was
a proper acceptance of the earnest money agreement we respectfully
submit the following:
This was a small family corporation in which all of the
transactions for many years had been done in an informal manner
and without strict compliance with the statute upon which the Cour
relies in its ruling.

To hold a familylike corporation such as

the Heath Development Company must comply literally with the provisions of Sec. 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated as amended, would
result in declaring void practically every act of the corporation
for years.

The record certainly shows that all the stockholders

agreed to the sale and were anxious that it be consummated and
gave the purchasers until May 1, 1974 in which to secure financin
Even the listing agreement entered into on November 13,
1973, was authorized by the President without complying with the
statutes and NO evidence of any statutory notice for the shareholders meeting held in November at the suggestion of the plainti
is indicated, nor was any objection by any stockholder ever
-2-

-3raised.
The signing of the name of the three absent shareholders
by their relatives has not been objected to by the defendant or any
individual shareholder or by this Honorable Court.
Many Utah cases recognize the validity of courses of conduct by small family type corporations where the stock is closely
held that does not meet the rigid rules tor large corporations.

Th

statement that the earnest money agreement entered into for the sal
was void, we believe to be inaccurate, possibly voidable but not vo
This Honorable Court held on a number of occasions in substance that where a party deals with a corporation in good faith he
is not affected by the fact that proper steps were not taken to
clothe the corporate officer with such authority.
In Peterson vs. Holmgren Land & Livestock Co., 12 Utah 2d
125 363 P.2d 786, Wade, J: stated at pagefe 130-31:
"If a corporate officer assuming to contract on
behalf of the corporation is one to whom authority to
make such a contract may be given, a person dealing with
him in good faith is not affected by the fact that the
proper steps to clothe him with ifhcit authority were not
taken.
* * * *

"Without belaboring the record any further, it is
sufficient to say ttfet there was nothing illegal or inequitable about the transaction ^hen it was entered into
by the parties' thereto. Both parfties had equal knowledge
of all the facts and were motivated by a desire to arrange
boundary lines so that each woulc^ benefit and there would
be no interference with each other in their resoective
projects."
-3-

-4Again in Shaw vs. Bailey-McCune Company, et al., 11 Utah
2d 93, 355 P.2d 321, Callister, J. stated at page 95:
"Under some circumstances the corporate entity may
be disregarded in the intent of justice in such
cases as fraud, contravention of law or contract,
or public wrong. * * *
"Moreover, the conditions under which the corporate entity may be disregarded or the corporation
be regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders
vary according to the circumstances in each case inasmuch as the doctrine is essentially an equitable
one and for that reason is particularly within the
province of the trial court."
The particular circumstanced in this case we submit was
the informality of the family corporate meetings.
In Grover vs. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 598, Faux,
D.J. stated at page 445.
"So we have the owners of substantially all of
the stock of the corporation, who were also the owners
of the land before it came into the corporation as its
primary asset, acting without the formality of a stockholders meeting or a written resolution in selling the
primary asset of the corporation. More, they agreed in
the name of the corporation, as part of the sale that all
payments should go from the buyers to Mr. and Mrs. Grover
individually and to turn over to the Garns property of
Mr. Grover consisting of shares of water stock and
rights for grazing cattle under the U.S. Taylor Grazing
Act. While this latter facet of the whole contract may
be termed a maverick and concededly not a model for all
corporate dealings yet as tendered in defense by the
Garn defendants and respondents we are not concerned
here with a corporation having a multitude of stockholders situated over a wide expanse of the country. The
two owners signed as vice president and secretary-treasurer of seller corporation on October 1, 1964. While
we do not approve the method employed here and certainly
-4-

-5denounce it as a pattern to be followed by corporations generally, we cannot disagree in this instance
with the statement of law:
"'* * * * but the trend of authority is to uphold
as binding on the corporations acts or contracts on
its behalf by a person or persons owning all or practically all the stock."
This case therefore held in substance that a contract
for the sale of a dry farm executed by the owners of substantially all of the stock of the corporation is binding upon the
corporation notwithstanding the fact that the sellers had not
complied with the procedure set forth in 16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated as amended.
We submit that this is in all respects identical to the
one at bar, it being a small family corporation in which the
stockholders and officers operated in the manner of a partnership
rather than the formality of a large corporation.

One of the prin-

cipal objectives, if not the principal objective, of this corporation, has been to sell the trailer court and distribute the money.
The operation of the trailer court has been continued only because they could not find a buyer.

The plaintiff and respondent

produced a buyer and then made it possible for the buyer to make
a cash deal.
POINT II.
THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT VOID BUT VOIDABLE
Plaintiff and respondent secured a purchaser for the
property and the offer to purchase presented January 13th was
-5-

-6within the 90 day listing period agreement signed November 13th.
The offer was presented to all qualified directors, and accepted
by all. The four owned over 80% of the voting stock.

If they

approved as stockholders, another meeting would be superfluous.
This contract was not void but at best only voidable.

The plain-

tiff and respondent suggested a five day period to reconsider.
No attempt to disaffirm this contract was taken by defendant until after the 90 day listing contract expired.
To permit the defendant corporation to treat the contract
as valid, which it can^^t do until after the listing period expire;
and then exercise their voidable option, creates a loop hole that
will enable a defendant to do a real estate concern out of its com
mission at will.
The facts are that the defendant treated the contract as
binding for not only the balance of the listing period, thereby
preventing the plaintiff from presenting any other offer to purchase during a substantial part of the listing period, but also
continued to treat the contract as binding until April 8, 1974
when the plaintiff was devoting his time in securing financing to
comply with the purchase agreement to pay cash in full.
To hold a family type corporation such as the Heath
Development Company must comply literally with the provisions
of Section 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated as amended, would result in declaring invalid practically every act of the corporation for years.
Defendants had ample opportunity to disclaim or to

rescind the actions of the corporation taken on January 13, 1974,
but instead chose to deprive the plaintiff and respondent of onethird of the listing period in which he well might have found
another buyer and let plaintiff and his a^lociates continue their
efforts to finance the sale.

The testimony of Mrs. Heath was in

substance that she changed her mind about signing the deed without further consultation or a meeting with the stockholders, but
only upon the advise of a husband of on^ of the minority stock-

Uwfcl
holders (one Flinders).

£t that time no question of the validity

of the sale had arisen by anyone of the members of this family
corporation.

It was only then that the president of the defendant

corporation suddenly became hesitant.
We would again like to call to this Court's attention
the recent case of Branch vs. Western Factors, Inc., 28 Utah
2d 61, 503 P.2d 510, and the language therein used by Mr. Justice
Ellett at page 363:
"Where, as in the execution of the trust deed
here under consideration, there is an entire absence of a
want of good faith, fraud and cpllusion, and the corporation is yet a going concern, no sound principal of law
prohibits a stockholder or director from dealing with the
corporation. A corporation is an artificial entity, and
one of the principal objects of its creation is to contrac
with individuals in du«r course of business. This it may
do with its directors and stockholders as well as with
others; and under the weight of American authority at
least, contracts made by the corporation with its officers
are not void per se, but at most voidable merely at the
election of the corporation or its representatives, within
a reasonable time.
"In the instant matter the transaction between
Heaps and his corporation occurred September 3, 1963.
Neither the corporation or any (stockholder or creditor
thereof ever complained about the deal. The cor-7-

-8poration collected the rentals until January, 1968,
when it filed its petition in bankruptcy.
"The trial court found on sufficient evidence before
it that 'the transaction between the cross-defendants,
Arnell E. Heaps and Western National Investment, Inc.,
was in good faith and for a fair and adequate consideration. '
11

An appellate court should not reverse a trial
court when the evidence is such as to sustain the findings made and the judgment rendered is based upon the
facts found and in accordance with the law of the case.
The judgment is affirmed with costs to respondent."
Judge Ellett quotes from the language of Singer vs. Salt
Lake Copper Manufacturing Co., 17 Utah 143, 53 P. 1024, a very
early case (1889).
"Where there is an entire absence of a want of good
faith, fraud, and collusion, and the corporation is yet
a going concern, no sound principle of law prohibits a
stockholder or director from dealing with the corporation. Contracts made by the corporation with its
officers are not void per se; but such contracts will
be carefully scrutinized in equity, and will be set
aside if not made in the utmost good faith."
In 19 Am. Jur.2d §1281 p. 689, we find the following:
"While occupying such a fiduciary relation, the
officers and directors of a corporation are precluded
from receiving any personal advantage without the fullest
disclosure to, and assent of, all concerned. However, a
corporation is entitled to repudiate a transaction made by
directors for their own benefit must act promptly on knowledge of the facts and cannot wait and speculate upon the
chances of delay. Also, the fiduciary duties of directors
as such do not preclude the stockholders, as parties contracting by a bylaw unanimously adopted and agreed to, from
ing in the directors a discretion which might be excused
in their personal favor."
If the earnest money receipt is only vodable, then the act
must occur within a reasonable time, and certainly before sub-

stantial rights or obligations have been created or terminated
because of the failure of ..the corporation to act in a responsible
manner.
Conflict of interest we believe to be an interest that
is adverse to the corporation•

In this case, all four of the

qualified directors had substantially equal adverse interest
as far as the corporation was concerned*

They wanted to liqui-

date the corporation and had been trying to do so for years.
All four,and particularly the president, Katherine
Heath and her sister, Essie Heath, because they were anxious to
liquidate the corporation and receive their share of the money
so they could enjoy it while they were still alive.

None of the

smaller stockholders who were all made defendants, originally
challenged the transaction as a stockholder.

All of the stock-

holders were aware of the terms of sale all along and if any
claim otherwise, they certainly were aware when they were served
with summons in the personal capacity.
holders.

None objected as stock-

The conduct of the plaintiff was certainly above re-

proach and considerable time was spent in the explaining not only
to the directors, but to other stockholders as to the amount of
money each would receive.
POINT III.
ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff further submits that the defendants are estoppec
from claiming any irregularity in the manner in which the sale
was made.
-9-
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In the case of Grover v. Garn, which we have heretofore
cited, 23 Utah 2d 441, the Court held that "under the doctrine
or principle of estoppel in pais one may by his acts or conduct
away from the court prevent himself from denying in court the
effect or result of those acts."

We respect a definition of long

standing taken from Black's Law Dictionary:
"An estoppel by the conduct or admissions of a party
* * * it is, and always was, a familiar principal in
the law of contracts. It lies at the foundation of morals and is a cardinal point in the exposition of promises, that one shall be bound by the state of facts which
he has induced another to act upon.
"The trial court ruled that Mr. and Mrs. Grover
by their acts and statements led the Garns to believe
that they had authority to sell the farm. We fail to
find evidence in the record that compels us to reverse
that ruling."
We submit the following cases on the subject of estoppel:
"Where all the officers of a corporation participate without dissent in an informal meeting thereof, and thereafter execute an agreement entered into
at such meeting, they are estopped to deny the
legality of the meeting. Kearneysville Creamery
Co. v. American Creamery Co., 51 ALR 938, 103
W Va 259. 137 SE 217."
M

The disregard for over twenty years by the stockholders of a business corporation of bylaws governing
the sale and transfer of stockcf the corporation and
giving stockholders the right to participate in the
purchase of stock before any sale thereof by a stockholder, and the failure of the stockholders to object
to any transfer or .sale although the bylaws had not
been complied with in any of the several sales and
transfers during such period amounts to a waiver of
such bylaws and precludes the stockholders from
asserting the bylaws as a ground for setting aside
a purchase of stock, although another bylaw provides
the manner of amending or modifying the bylaws.
Elliott v. Lindquist, 169 ALR 1369, 356 pa 385, 52
A2d 180.
-10-

-11SUMMARY
The otter and acceptance placed another obligation on
the plaintiff. To find some means to enable the purchaser to comply with the provisions ot tne agreement to sell.

The sellers had

been told to taKe time to consider the ciffer, be sure they wanted
to sell on the terms presented.
The balance of the listing period expired and the plaintiff
continued his efforts to find financing for the purchaser. Testimon
in the record indicates the plaintiff did find the financing; this
was one of the conditions of the agreement to sell.

Only then did

the same persons who agreed to sell make the decision not to sell.
The court's opinion dismisses this by cohcluding the first agreement
meant nothing.

The trial court in listening to all the witnesses

concluded Katherine Heath, as the president, or as a director, or
as an individual could not do this.

She had used her position as

president, as director and as a stockholder to enter into the agreement and had remained quiet for this long period of time and now
after the plaintiff had fully performed, she shouldnot he allowed
to disavow the prior contract and agreement with impunity.

This may

be called estoppel, but by whatever name, to permit this to be done
with impunity is not justice but injustice; to require the transaction involved in this case to be approved by a majority of a disinterested board of directors is not possible, as there are only four
directors and if two are purchasers the transaction cannot be made.
This seems like an undesirable result and one the Court, would hot
-11-

-12wish to establish.
Sandra Flinders had never met the requirements stated in
the Articles of Incorporation to become a director.

To require

an illegal or unqualified director as a necessary party to approve
what the Court has otherwise designated as a void or illegal contra«
does not sound like good law. We must either assume the President
had the power to approve the sale which is evident she did, or we
must consider the sales agreement as being approved with over 80%
of the stockholders . To go out of ones way to find a contract not
binding and thereby establish a questionable principal, is also in
conflict with case law of this State. (See Grover vs. Garn); to loo
at the facts with the view toward justice and integrity and hold pe
to their obvious intentions when it can be done with more attention
to reality than to obstruct the obvious intent by looking for techr
cal means to obstruct justice.
There was no directors1 meeting called to authorize the
listing agreement and the manner of calling the stockholders1 meeting did not meet the statutory provisions and the signing of the n<
of three stockholders who were not present by other members of
the family simply illustrates the informality with which the affai:
of the corporation were conducted.

Examination of the offer to

purchase and its acceptance shows it was signed by stockholders
owning over 80% of the corporation stock. These individuals signe
cr
as individuals, as stockholder, *•* as directors. From the docume
neither of those positions are plausible. One thing is abundantly
-12-

-13clear.

They all intended to sell the property.

had the authority to do what they were Jdoing.

They thought they

The questions at th

meetings explaining how much money each one would share personally
Everyone was to be paid out of the purchase price. At the time thi
offer was accepted, the plaintifffs listing agreement had another
30 days to run.
fact.

The opinion of this Court seems to disregard that

On January 13, 1974, when defendant co<rporation, through it.

stockholders meeting accepted the offer, plaintifffs listing agreement had 30 days more to run.
The plaintiff1s claim is generally disposed of by assumptions that are not in keeping with the facts of the case.
This plaintiff developed and presented an offer to purchai
the property.

There is no conflict in this statement as to the ac-

tual facts and the findings of the trial court.

If the plaintiff

was sufficiently alert and reasonably successful to find a purchase
that defendants should have found, but did not, that fact in itseli
certainly should not detract from the credit due to the salesman.
The Heath Development Corporation had, over a number of
years, as its primary objective - the sale of the trailer court to distribute the money, and dissolve th[e corporation. The continue
operation of the trailer court was an activity tolerated only becai:
and until a sale could be made.

To hole} the contract to sell bad

because the parties failed to follow

tjhe procedure of the Utah Cc

16-10-74, constitutes reaching to justify a decision.

If the Heath

Development Company's activities were measured by the provisions of
-13-

-14Utah Code Annotated 16-10-74, it would result in voiding practically all of the actions of this small family corporation for years
CONCLUSION
We therefore respectfully submit that this Honorable
Court failed to consider (1) the past manner of doing business by
this corporation; (2) the fact that it was a small family organization that operated informally, perhaps as a partnership; (3) that
defendant had ample opportunity to nullify its actions which were
agreed upon at the meeting of January 13, 1974, but failed to resc:
the agreement, but instead let plaintiff and respondent complete H
entire work and only then, on April 8, 1974, almost one month aheac
of the optional time which it was granted to refinance and complete
the transaction, did Mrs, Heath, acting only upon the advi#e of an
outsider, Flinders, did the plaintiff become aware that the transation would not be completed and that defendant was going to rescin
(4)

after plaintiff had completed all the requirements of the lis

ing and the earnest money agreements, with full knowledge to defen
dants of plaintifffs activities, defendant should be estopped from
rescinding the agreement at this late stage.
We therefore submit that the only possible reason for her
refusal to sign the deed was plain "sellers remorse" and no' other
reason.

Although the agreement on and shortly after January 13, J

may have been voidable, it was certainly not void and defendants
had a duty to act within a reasonable time to avoid the corporatic

-14-

-15being bound under the listing agreement and earnest money con
tracts.
We therefore submit that the plaintiff and respondent is
entitled to have this Honorable Court reconsider its ruling.

-15-

